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that she is not merely impatient. She is too receptive and wide-minded for that, too sensitive to every wind of culture that blows. She may not have achieved the concentration of the professional philosopher, but she moves with familiar appreciation among the literatures and arts of all times and all countries, and shows a sympathy with diverse points of view which is rarely found in philosophers. In particular she has a profound emotional understanding—and this is most surprising in a rationalist—of religious feelings, to the description of which she devotes several moving pages (i, 245-250). She broods tenderly and wistfully over the immemorial delusions of mankind. Unlike the mischievous character in Ibsen's 'Wild-Duck,' from which her title comes, she would never go about pulling off people's wigs to reveal the nakedness of their heads. Only, when philosophers begin to argue that the wigs are real hair, it is too much for her, and the instincts of the lover of truth rise up in revolt.

London, England.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

ETHICS AND THE FAMILY. By W. F. Lofthouse. London : Hodder & Stoughton, 1912. Pp. xvi, 403.

This book is written from what may roughly be called a socialistic point of view. Its method follows, in an important particular, the method of Herbert Spencer. When its author would analyze the meaning and value of any social institution of our time, he is inevitably driven to consider 'primitive races' and 'savage tribes.' For example, we find (p. 302) : "We must ask ourselves what is the place of religion in human life. This large question leads us inevitably back to that dim region in which we tried to discover the beginnings of the family." On page 58 we read: "Let us then advance into the strange jungle of primitive customs and ideas relating to the family, to see what can be learnt from them about its origins." The results of Mr. Lofthouse's inquiries are, however, directly opposed to Mr. Spencer's conclusions. Family life at its best gives us the ideal towards which the State must move. "The predatory and competitive instincts (they cannot be separated) of which the orthodox economists constituted themselves the high priests must in the end, like another Philistine Dagon, bow before a holier and more fundamental power. It is the

glory of that power to bind together human beings of both sexes, of varying capacities, and of all ages, in a society which apportions to each according to his need, and expects, and obtains, from each according to his skill and strength" (p. 255).

Mr. Lofthouse holds that the family, rather than the individual, is the social unit. He maintains that the family group is the essential minimum within which the social virtues are developed. He believes family life, with its mutual affection, mutual care, and recognition of responsibility of the whole for each and all of its parts, is the seed bed from which alone society can hope to raise that quality of human character without which the highest and happiest social life must forever be impossible. But he differs from the more distinguished writers who have claimed that this unique power belongs to the discipline and opportunities of family life,¹ in that he thinks the State can, without impairing family life or lessening the discipline of its affections and responsibilities, provide, not only old age pensions, free meals for school children, the endowment of motherhood; but abolish destitution, "guarantee to all normal human beings within its territory a reasonable minimum of the objects of human need and desire," . . . and "in return for such guarantee the State shall enforce the right use of these objects, and shall sternly put down any attempt at waste or neglect." "The State will require a certain amount of cleanliness, industry, and attention to the well-known laws of health" (p. 394).

One wonders if Mr. Lofthouse contemplates a time when the State will guarantee to a man a wife, or to a woman, a husband? Yet these are surely "objects of human need and desire" which may well seem to fall within "a reasonable minimum," especially in the eyes of so ardent an advocate of family life. Our author has indeed an enviable belief in the power of the State. He speaks (p. 294) of the community (and obviously means the State), "Compelling right acts, and preventing the performance of wrong ones." I have tried to let my quotations show not only the position of the writer, but the quality of his thought and style.

De Quincey made a distinction between the literature of

¹ He mentions especially Professor B. Bosanquet, from whom he differs at length (p. 291, *et seq.*) and Mrs. B. Bosanquet (p. 254).

knowledge and the literature of power. We have been used to think of the latter as the gift of wings lent to an identical content, by means of a new medium of expression. The democratization of literature may require us to welcome a new literature of power which bears to the literature of knowledge the relation which the average Sunday sermon bears to the Bible. The new sermon finds a larger audience than the old, it displays about as much and as little critical acumen as did its forerunner, but it performs the perhaps useful function of drawing attention to the sayings of greater people, and mixing them with sufficient of our own imbecility to make us feel interested in them. When the heart of the teacher is in the right place (as in the book before us), it is easy to forgive the shortcomings of the sermon. The next in order will carry the interpretation one step further, let us hope.

The book is of to-day (it discusses Mr. Lloyd-George's Insurance Act) and of to-day only. The ephemeral nature of the sermon is its excuse and its justification: but need it be so long?

London, England.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

MARRIAGE, ITS ETHICS AND RELIGION. By the Rev. Principal P. T. Forsyth, M.A., D.D. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1912. Pp. viii, 152.

Mr. Forsyth's book is an expansion of a lecture delivered in connection with the National Council of Public Morals. It is inspired by a desire to reply to those whom Mr. Forsyth regards as the most dangerous opponents of marriage as he understands it, namely, those "critical Idealists, who would dissolve the traditional view of the sanctity of marriage under the belief that its fixity is a premium on hypocrisy, and that they are exalting and purifying it." These people attack the traditional view of marriage in the name of freedom, but they play into the hands of the vicious, and they do not see the damage which would be caused if their views were adopted by society generally. Moreover, views destructive of the traditional view of marriage are supported by the literature of our time. We live in a literary age, and for this reason the æsthetic or erotic view of marriage tends naturally to be stressed, because this view lends itself best to literary effect.

Mr. Forsyth discusses marriage as it concerns the individual,